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TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION IN 
LEGAL HISTORY 
G. Edward White* 
In the past few years I have published two books1 that have gen-
erated several responses from commentators in scholarly journals. 
'.(his Essay has been generated by those responses, and by the kind 
invitation of the editors of this volume. Since the Essay responds to 
commentary principally through an effort to clarify my views on 
methodology in legal history, I want briefly to dispose of some less 
indirect reactions to commentators. Some of the commentary has 
been principally appreciative,2 and I want to acknowledge the plea-
sure that an author takes in discovering that someone has read, en-
joyed, and perhaps even profited from his work. Other commentary 
has infused appreciative comments with searching criticism;3 it is 
this set of responses that has provoked me to respond. Yet another 
set of commentators has criticized my work without, seemingly, 
m~king the effort to understand my scholarly purposes or to insure 
that their criticisms were fairly stated or fully supportable.4 I have 
noted the names of this set of commentators - a Revolution or a 
Day of Judgment may yet come, and the information may be useful 
- but this Essay is hardly for them. 
The purpose of this Essay is to distinguish my approach toward 
historical scholarship from two other approaches. One approach 
rests on the premise that historical scholarship is a search for objec-
tive truth; this is most clearly articulated in the work of general his-
• Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1963, Amherst College; M.A. 1964, Ph.D. 
1967, Yale University; J.D. 1970, Harvard University. The author would like to thank G.L. 
Francione, Saul Levmore, Jeffrey O'Connell, and George Rutherglen for their help with sev-
eral stages of this essay. - Ed. 
I. G. WHITE,,PATIERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT {1978); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA (1980). This essay does not consider reviews prompted by G. WHITE, THE AMER!• 
CAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1976). 
2. E.g., Corrigan, Book Review, 60 B.U. L. REV. 801 (1980); Fellman, Book Review, 85 
AM. HIST. Rev. 1253 (1980); Yarbrough, Book Review, 5 VA. B. ASSN. J. 25 (1979). 
3. E.g., Feinman, The Role of Ideas in Legal History, 18 MICH. L. Rev. 722 (1980); 
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torians but shared by some contemporary legal historians. 5 The 
other approach rests on the premise that historical scholarship 
should be informed by the philosophical perspectives of Marxism. 6 
While I shall spend some time criticizing these two approaches, I 
shall expend the bulk of my efforts in attempting to set forth, in pre-
liminary form, the basis of my own position. 
The essay consists of four sections. Section I discusses the nature 
of historical explanation, devoting some attention to the roles of 
"truth," interpretation, and detachment in historical scholarship. 
Section II continues that discussion by exploring the meaning and 
the purpose of what I call "interpretive detachment" in the writing of 
history. Section III considers the theoretical assumptions of Marxist 
legal historians from the point of view developed in preceding sec-
tions. Section IV, taking into account some issues that remain prob-
lematic or troublesome, restates my approach. 
I. THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
A work of historical scholarship can communicate at four levels. 
On a first level of communication, which is commonly taken to be 
the most significant, the work seeks to contribute to or to recast ex-
isting scholarly wisdom through a proposed interpretation of a par-
ticular series of events. I call this level the level of historical 
narrative. At a second level, the work seeks to subsume this pro-
posed interpretation within a particular perspective on the subject of 
history itself: I call this level the level of historiography. At a third 
level, the work argues for the general primacy of that historiographi-
cal perspective as a way of interpreting reality: I call this level the 
level of metahistory. And at a fourth level, if the basic assumptions 
and perspectives of the second and third levels are adopted, the work 
suggests that certain normative implications for contemporary pol-
icy-making follow. I call this level the level of metapolitics. 
Not all historical scholarship, of course, explicitly communicates 
on each of these four levels, and some does not even address the 
kinds of issues that one associates with the levels of metahistory and 
5. See, e.g., 0. HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HISTORY (1979); Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in Ameri-
can Legal History, 53 IND. L.J. 449 (1978). Professor Handlin states the premise succinctly: 
"(T]he world of the elapsed past has its own reality, independent of who attempts to view and 
describe it, and is thus objective." 0. HANDLIN at 1. 
6. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 3, at 730-36; Gabel, Intention and Stmcture in Contractual 
Conditions: Outline of a Method far Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977); 
Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, l MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978). A less 
explicit Marxist perspective appears in M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW (1977). 
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metapolitics. Increasingly, however, scholarship in legal history has 
communicated on several of these levels, and the more visible legal 
history scholarship of the last decade can be read as conveying 
messages on all four levels of communication. Lawrence Friedman's 
A History of American Law' provides an example. 
When I reviewed Friedman's History in 1973, I suggested that 
with its publication the field of American legal history may have 
"come of age."8 By "coming of age" I meant principally that Fried-
man's work might provoke others to examine source materials in the 
field and to provide alternative scholarly explanations of past events 
where they thought Friedman's were deficient, thereby causing 
scholarship in American legal history to proliferate and mature. I 
also intended, almost as an afterthought, a second meaning that 
seems to have been more prophetic: that Freidman had created a 
new type of work, one that expanded the boundaries of American 
legal history as a field of scholarly interest. In addition to covering a 
wide variety of historical themes and topics, Friedman propounded a 
theory of the relationship between law and society in America. He 
suggested that, at any point in its history, American law has reflected 
the "push and pull" of elite groups that seek to fashion it to further 
their current interests;9 he also suggested, less overtly, that such a 
process has continued into the present; he could also fairly be read as 
suggesting that this process contains elements of injustice that should 
be exposed and modified. 
Friedman, in short, communicated on all of the levels I have pre-
viously identified. His History first proposed that changes in legal 
doctrine are principally brought about by changes in the distribution 
of economic and political power in society: that theme was the or-
ganizing principle of his historical narrative. He next argued for the 
general significance of viewing law in American history as an "in-
strument" or "tool" of "the people in power,"10 and thereby commu-
nicated his historiographical perspective. He then argued further for 
the primacy of a general view of the history of American society that 
attributed great significance to the current self-interest of elite pres-
sure groups, thereby communicating on the level of metahistory. Fi-
nally, Friedman argued that, as contemporary Americans, we ought 
to be concerned about the implications of that general view, and that 
the methodological perspective he was employing in A History of 
7. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). 
8. White, Book Review, 59 VA. L. REV. 1130 (1973). 
9. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 25. 
10. Id. at 10, 25. 
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American Law had distinctive implications as a contemporary polit-
ical statement. By making this last argument, Friedman communi-
cated on the level of metapolitics and suggested a close relationship 
between theories of history and theories of contemporary affairs. 
The multileveled communication of works such as Freidman's 
History invites us to reconsider the nature of historical explanation, 
and to ask what distinguishes historical scholarship from contempo-
rary theorizing. I begin that reconsideration by noting the existence 
of an enduring professional constraint upon historical writing that I 
shall call the "canon of detachment." This canon has two distinct 
aspects. What I call "interpretive detachment" is the suspension of 
prejudgment toward the historical evidence that one is examining. 
Interpretative detachment focuses tangentially on the first, but prin-
cipally on the second and third levels of communication in historical 
scholarship. Interpretive detachment seeks to insure that the or-
ganizing interpretive principle of a historical narrative - the feature 
that defines the work's historiographical perspective - will be se-
lected solely by reference to the criterion of plausibility, with plausi-
bility determined by the "internal logic," the "contemporary fit," 
and the "current common sense" of the interpretation. 11 Interpretive 
detachment assumes that while it may well be impossible for a histo-
rian to choose an organizing interpretation that ignores his metahis-
torical and metapolitical perspectives, the plausibility of his chosen 
interpretation may not rest solely on the purported validity of those 
perspectives. 
The second aspect of the canon is what I call "truth detachment," 
and its focus is primarily on the levels of historical narrative and 
historiography. Truth detachment assumes that the organizing inter-
pretive principle on which a historical narrative rests must be capa-
ble of being refuted through reference to the evidence on which the 
interpretative principle rests: that is, the principle must contain the 
seeds of its own falsification. I shall have more to say about both 
these aspects of the canon of detachment shortly; here I merely seek 
to define them. 
One of the striking features of the canon of detachment in histor-
ical interpretation is that it has endured, albeit represented impre-
cisely in terms such as "objectivity" or "neutrality," despite 
significant changes in professional research techniques. Qualitative 
and quantitative analyses of historical data have gone in and out of 
11. "Internal logic," "contemporary fit," and "current co=on sense" are defined and dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 16-19. 
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fashion, and ideas and events have risen and fallen in their stature as 
causative agents. But a professional judgment has persisted that a 
historian could produce plausible and falsifiable interpretations of 
the subject matter that forms the basis of his narrative. An obvious 
conclusion to be drawn from the persistence of the canon of detach-
ment is that "bias," either at the level of historical narrative or at the 
levels of historiography and metahistory, is regarded an "unprofes-
sional" quality in an historian. 
I want to probe the basis of that apparent judgment about bias in 
historical scholarship by discussing the canon of detachment in more 
detail. But at this early stage it is worth noting that adherence to the 
canon of detachment cannot be said to be the sole prerequisite for 
"successful" historical scholarship. Another prerequisite seems 
equally necessary to "success": the criterion of engagement. The en-
gagement criterion, like the canon of detachment, can be seen as 
containing two distinguishable features. Engagement first refers to 
the scholar's immersion in his subject. This feature of the criterion, 
while vital in generating narratives that give a charged meaning to 
historical subject matter and thereby create a vicarious appeal for 
readers, is less significant for my purposes. I am principally con-
cerned with the feature of engagement that refers to the professional 
reader's immersion in the organizing interpretive principle of a his-
torical narrative. 
Engagement in this second sense becomes a synonym for the pro-
cess of stimulating further scholarly inquiry. When a professional 
reader becomes engaged by an historical explanation, he may be mo-
tivated to pursue related inquiries. When a reader is thus engaged, 
the explanation can be said to be suggestive. It is suggestive in the 
sense that it gives a vivid meaning to a narrative about the past, and 
it is suggestive, when the reader is a professional historian, in that it 
may stimulate ideas for further study. In a professional context, the 
principal value of an interpretation that satisfies the criterion of en-
gagement is that it provides examples for future work. I shall return 
to this feature of engagement at a later point: 
Historical explanation can thus be seen as a process where two 
entities - a canon of detachment and a criterion of engagement -
interact, sometimes in complementary and sometimes in opposing 
ways. Such features of historical explanation as the choice of a topic 
for research, the extraction of meaning from sources, or the juxtapo-
sition of the experiences of the writer and readers against those of 
another age, can be. seen as techniques by which a historian's en-
gagement with his subject is conveyed. In effective historical writing 
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this quality of engagement is transferred to the reader, who is made 
to feel that the topic is stimulating and timely, that the sources are 
rich and fascinating, and that the subject matter merits further explo-
ration. Sometimes the detachment of the scholar adds to this sense 
of reader engagement by suggesting that all this fascinating "history" 
is not just the product of a vivid scholarly imagination. 
At other times, however, the canon of detachment serves as a re-
minder that the engagement of a historian may not overwhelm his 
interpretive stance if his scholarly product is to be deemed "success-
ful." The canon suggests, for example, that if a topic seems chosen 
for its contemporary attractiveness, and the writer's stance towards 
the topic reflects a partisan current perspective, readers will become 
suspicious. It suggests that if a historian habitually extracts one 
meaning from his sources, or seems to strain their meaning, or seems 
to use them selectively, readers will begin to reconstruct in their 
minds a historical "record" that lies beyond the writer's interpreta-
tions. It further suggests that if the juxtaposition of past and present 
experiences seems to lead inexorably to a simplistic "lesson from his-
tory," readers will wonder if the lesson is merely a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. And it suggests, finally, that if all the above reactions on 
the part of readers produce a sense that a given historian is "biased," 
that historian's arguments will probably be dismissed, and will not 
serve as guidelines for future study. 
The interplay of engagement and detachment in historical writ-
ing is especially important in historical scholarship that communi-
. cates at the four levels previously identified. Such scholarship 
consciously seeks to increase its audience's engagement, and also to 
expand the meaning of history, by interweaving historical explana-
tion with contemporary political theory, thereby suggesting that 
"good" history and "good" politics are not easily separable. How 
can this genre of historical scholarship avoid being regarded as lack-
ing proper detachment? 
To address this question is to reconsider the professional function 
of the historian. Both interpretive detachment and truth detachment 
rest on certain assumptions about the unique contributions of history 
as a profession. I want first to consider some assumptions on which 
truth detachment could be said to rest. One is that lay persons re-
gard historians' interpretations of the past as truth, or at least as ap-
proximations of truth. Another is that "true" interpretations of the 
past are possible because the historical "record" has some objective 
reality. A third is that a detached stance in the historian fosters a 
faithful reproduction of the historical record. Each of these assump-
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tions needs qualification. While lay persons may regard history as 
merely a faithful reproduction of "the record," most historians do 
not. Most historians view history as the interplay of a "record," 
which can vary in its content, with scholarly efforts to interpret that 
record. 12 Indeed, the conception of a historical record as a set of 
indisputably "true" facts that have a meaning independent of their 
presence in various historical interpretations is a highly problematic 
notion. Karl Popper has argued, categorically, that "there can be no 
history of 'the past as it actually did happen'; there can only be his-
torical interpretations, and none of them final." 13 
If Popper is correct, the value of historians' interpretations of the 
past lies not so much in their "truth," or faithful reconstruction of an 
objective record, as in their current suggestiveness and plausibility. 
If fidelity to truth were the principal goal of historical writing, the 
concededly continuous process of historical revision would be mean-
ingless: faithful reproductions of history, once found to be true, 
would be incapable of being revised. Popper thus shifts attention 
from questions about the objective accuracy of a historical explana-
tion to questions about the success of the explanation as a suggestive 
and plausible, if temporary, interpretation. For Popper, a successful 
historical explanation is conscious of its "point of view," thereby 
avoiding "uncritical bias," is fertile, thereby stimulating others to 
think about its propositions, and is "topical," thereby helping to 
"elucidate the problems of the day." 14 
Despite Popper's rejection of the idea of history as synonymous 
with objective truth, he endorses truth detachment as I have defined 
it. Popper argues that for a scholarly explanation to be profession-
ally successful, it must be capable of being falsified: its propositions 
must rest on evidence that contains the seeds of their prospective 
revision. 15 This is the point where I part company with Popper and 
find the concept of truth detachment precarious. If one accepts, ar-
guendo, Popper's claim that "truth" in history cannot be divorced 
from interpretation, on what basis can an interpretation be falsifi-
able? Surely not by a testing of it against "truth." Indeed, Popper 
himself suggests that the tests for "successful" scholarship (self-
12. Handlin, for example, juxtaposes his conception of an "objective" record against "the 
scholar's vision," which he calls "subjective, at least to the extent that his own point of obser-
vatic;m and the complex lenses of prejudice, interest, and preconception shape what he discerns 
and therefore what he can portray." 0. HANDLIN, supra note 5, at I. 
13. 2 K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 268 (4th ed. 1962), 
14. Id. 
15. See K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 215-17, 312-14 (1963); K. POPPER, 
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 31-50 (1959). 
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consciousness, fertility, topicality) are tests that presuppose some in-
articulate professional "common sense" about scholarly interpreta-
tion. But interpretations are necessarily different from "what 
actually happened." 
At this point, I believe, one has to choose. One may resurrect the 
idea of truth in history, and argue that while ''what actually hap-
pened" is of limited utility until it is interpreted, conformity to the 
integrity of a finite historical record is a justifiable evaluative crite-
rion for "successful" historical scholarship. Or one may reject both 
truth in history and Popper's notion of falsification, and argue that 
all the evaluative criteria for successful historical scholarship are in-
terpretive criteria, and that therefore the canon of detachment in his-
torical writing is meaningful only in its interpretive aspect. 
In the following section I want to develop a justification for the 
latter choice, and to explore more fully the relationship of my views 
to those of Popper and to those of Thomas Kuhn. Before so doing, 
let me summarize the presentation to this point. I have argued that 
visible and prominent contemporary scholarship, as evidenced by re-
cent work in the field oflegal history, communicates on levels - the 
levels of historiography, metahistory, and metapolitics - that go far 
beyond the narrow definition of history as "what actually happened 
in the past," and implicitly cast serious doubts on the intelligibility of 
that definition. The communication levels that I find striking in con-
temporary historical scholarship are levels of interpretation, such as 
the levels of metahistory and metapolitics, that convey distinctly nor-
mative contemporary messages. These levels of communication, 
which are intended, among other things, to increase reader engage-
ment, confront a canon of detachment in historical scholarship. The 
process of historical explanation can be seen as an interplay between 
a search for engagement and this canon whose meaning, I have be-
gun to argue, lies not at the level of fidelity to truth, but at the level 
of interpretation. I now tum to a further extrapolation of that last 
argument. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERPRETIVE DETACHMENT 
An example based on one of the hypotheses I advanced in Tort 
Law In America may serve as a useful introduction to some of the 
distinctions I intend to make in this portion of the Essay. In that 
book I argued that the "modem" negligence standard in American 
tort law, which conditioned liability on legal fault and defined fault 
to include "unreasonable" misfeasance as well as nonf easance, was 
not solely or even principally a response to industrialization. Let us 
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suppose that my support for this argument rests on two kinds of evi-
dence: evidence of the absence of "modem" negligence cases at a 
time when industrialization has become a feature of American soci-
ety, and evidence of the appearance of a distinctive mode of Ameri-
can legal thought - a mode that placed great emphasis on the 
derivation, articulation, and application of generalized standards for 
legal conduct - precisely at the time when "modem" negligence 
cases began to appear in striking numbers. 
Now assume that a legal historian, in evaluating the "success" of 
my argument, discovers numerous "modem" negligence cases de-
cided before the time when I assert that the new mode of thought 
came into being. The historian claims that these cases suggest that 
my argument is fl.awed. What assumptions have been made by my 
argument and by that claim, and how do those assumptions relate to 
the roles of truth and interpretation in history? 
In resting my argument about modem negligence on "evidence" 
from the past, and especially in attaching some significance to time 
demarcations of the past, I seem to be deriving a hypothesis from 
some finite, discoverable, temporally divisible historical record. But 
a moment's reflection suggests that this is not quite what I am doing. 
Instead, I am assuming the established salience of industrialization 
as a causal factor in the growth of negligence law, and then attempt-
ing to show that the salience of that factor can be undermined 
through the use of currently acceptable research techniques, such as 
analysis of common-law cases. The critical steps in my argument are 
not what I "find" in the record about industrialization and a modem 
negligence standard, but what I assume to be the appropriate frame 
of reference for pursuing scholarly inquiries. 
In discovering the modem negligence cases that I ignored, the 
critic seems also to be bringing evidence from a finite historical rec-
ord "to light" and then claiming that my argument is not faithful to 
the "record." Again, the critic is not quite doing that: the critic is 
assuming that my "counter-hypothesis" ( changed ideas about law) is 
also a salient causal factor, and then employing a currently accepta-
ble research technique (the discovery and analysis of cases and their 
correlation with time segments) to question that hypothesis. The 
critic and I, in short, share an assumed technique of scholarly in-
.. qmry. 
Where do these assumptions about the saliency of hypotheses 
and the acceptability of research techniques come from? One thing 
seems clear: they do not come simply from observations of the rec-
ord of the past. Given the multifaceted quality of American society 
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and the diverse products of the legal profession, mere observation of 
the past would not seem to compel the assumptions that industriali-
zation invariably helps to explain changes in American law, or that 
common-law cases are significant manifestations of how American 
law changes, or that the dates of particular types of cases have any 
generalizable significance. It appears that assumptions such as these 
are produced in a much more complex way. I referred earlier to the 
notion of plausibility in historical scholarship, which I said was de-
termined by the "internal logic," the "contemporary fit," and the 
"current common sense" of a proposed hypothesis. The factors de-
termining plausibility can also be taken as rough descriptions of the 
factors that go into determining saliency in a scholarly hypothesis or 
acceptability in a scholarly research technique. 
"Internal logic" is a dangerous phrase to use in this context, be-
cause it may connote some finite sense of rationality or truth and 
thereby resurrect conceptions this essay has sought to place to one 
side. I am using the phrase in what might be called a ''weak" sense. 
Thomas Kuhn, while agreeing with Karl Popper that history cannot 
properly be equated with "what actually happened," has argued that 
Popper's work, taken as a whole, presses one to the conclusion that 
hypotheses can be "tested" and found "false," that they can thus be 
labeled "mistakes," and that scholars "learn from [their] mistakes." 16 
Kuhn rejects these views, arguing that the "success" or "failure" of 
scholarly hypotheses is not determined by "exclusively logical crite-
ria" but by the "professionally shared imperatives" of a scholarly 
community. 17 
I agree with Popper and Kuhn that history is best understood as 
tentative interpretations of the past, and with Kuhn that no exclu-
sively logical criteria can be supplied to determine whether a given 
interpretation "rings true." But that is not to say that no interpreta-
tion could ever be deemed "unsuccessful" because it off ended some 
variety of internal professional logic. An interpretation, for exam-
ple, that "industrialization" caused the development of an Old Eng-
lish dialect in remote regions of Appalachia, even though such 
regions were devoid of any of the characteristics conventionally as-
sociated with an industrial environment, could, I believe, be rejected 
on "logical" grounds. The "internal logic" would, however, be 
"weak" in that it rested on a professional assumption that "industrial 
characteristics" could be defined and understood. If "logic" is used 
16. T. KUHN, THE EssENTIAL TENSION 270-78 (1977). 
17. Id. at 288, 292. 
604 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:594 
in this weakened sense, I find it to have some effect not only on the 
plausibility of historical interpretations but on the saliency of hy-
potheses and the acceptability of research techniques. 
The "internal logic" criterion, however, is less central than the 
remaining two criteria. The Appalachian dialect example shows 
how closely "contemporary fit" and internal logic are linked. If a 
profession takes for granted a working definition of "industrial char-
acteristics," and no such characteristics appear during a time seg-
ment in the past, an interpretation of that period that emphasizes the 
"industrialization" hypothesis has no "contemporary fit." But few 
hypotheses are as clearly flawed as the Appalachia dialect example; 
the process of evaluating a hypothesis in light of "contemporary fit" 
is usually far subtler. In fleshing out the "contemporary fit" criterion 
one reaches such issues as the relevancy of temporal demarcations, 
the intelligibility of a "period gestalt" and of "social change," and 
other familiar puzzles for philosophers of history. I shall merely 
note here that "contemporary fit" analysis seems to be a central fea-
ture of historical criticism. 
The Appalachian dialect example also illustrates a link between 
the criterion of internal logic and the criterion I have called "current 
common sense." This is the most mysterious, and perhaps most cen-
tral, of the criteria being discussed. The Appalachian dialect hy-
pothesis would be likely to offend this criterion because the 
hypothesis seems nonsensical not only when applied to the time pe-
riod it seeks to illuminate, but also as a general piece of wisdom. A 
hypothesis focusing on a causal factor that is not present at the time 
that it is supposed to be "causing" things to happen offends our no-
tions of the meaning of causation. Although it is perhaps possible to 
redefine some terms so as to avoid this difficulty, that enterprise, in 
the Appalachian dialect example, does not seem particularly promis-
ing.18 Its lack of promise, however, is not just a function of the ab-
sence of evidence about "industrial characteristics." Its lack of 
promise is also a function of current understandings about how 
scholars use and reason from evidence. 
Here "current common sense" takes on another level of meaning. 
It does not mean simply the "common sense" of an ordinary rational 
18. The Appalachian dialect hypothesis could be made more credible by a redefinition of 
"dialect." One could argue that industrialization "caused" Appalachian language patterns to 
take the form of a "dialect" by facilitating greater social intercourse in areas other than Ap-
palachia, and thereby deprovincializing American language patterns. A "dialect" would then 
be an original provincial language pattern that, given deprovincialization, appeared to be 
unique. This restatement of the hypothesis would not be patently illogical, although its work-
ing definition of historical causation would seem to strain that concept. 
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person in the 1980s; it means in addition the "common sense" of the 
professional community that is evaluating a work of scholarship. At 
this point I find the insights of Kuhn most useful. Kuhn has argued 
that "rhetorically induced and professionally shared imperatives" 
are the central factors that affect the direction of scholarly research 
and criticism. These imperatives become "institutionalized," and 
emerge as "maxims and values" that "explain the outcome of choices 
that could not have been dictated by logic and experiment alone." 19 
"Current common sense" in a professional community can be 
said to be a crude encapsulation of this insight of Kuhn's. The con-
cept of current common sense, I have said, is both mysterious and 
central. It is mysterious because the process by which "profession-
ally shared imperatives" emerge and disappear is not one that seems 
capable of precise or rigorous analysis. One senses that in one schol-
arly generation the formulation of "grand theory" is taken to be a 
serious or even an essential task of scholarship, whereas in another 
the same task is regarded as counterproductive. One senses that 
scholarship in given disciplines or professions is conducted within 
what Kuhn used to call "paradigms" and now calls "disciplinary 
matrices":20 contexts based on shared professional assumptions 
about the scope, direction, and design of research. But one cannot 
seem to articulate, in any precise fashion, how such "professionally 
shared imperatives" are created. When one tries, as I have on occa-
sion, one's critics are sometimes provided with a reason for keeping 
their teeth sharpened. 
Although the common-sense criterion may be mysterious, it is 
also central to an understanding of the nature of historical explana-
tion and of the significance of interpretive detachment in the writing 
of history. Interpretive detachment, I have suggested, has as its prin-
cipal purpose the neutralization of bias. Taking interpretive detach-
ment seriously assumes that one also takes bias as a given. Historical 
explanations are assumed to be personal interpretations of the past 
that gain legitimacy by persuading other persons that they are provi-
sionally acceptable as a form of professional wisdom. I think that we 
might agree, as a preliminary matter, that an interpretation that does 
not sufficiently divest itself of its "personal" or "individualized" fea-
tures is an interpretation that appears as "biased." But why is bias 
stigmatized, and what is the relationship between this stigmatization 
and the current common sense criterion? 
19. T. KUHN, supra note 16, at 292. 
20. Compare T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 38-42 (2d ed. 1970) 
with T. KUHN, supra note 16, at 297-319. 
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If we believe, with Kuhn, that current common sense is a myste-
rious but powerful force in the legitimation of scholarly hypotheses, 
it seems that current common sense bears a close and potential-
ly treacherous relationship to plausibility in scholarly discourse. 
Plausibility seems to contain, on initial reflection, a component of 
"rationality," "inner logic," or some such "neutral" or "objective" 
standard for evaluating scholarship. I have included such a compo-
nent in my definition of plausibility. But suppose one seeks to build 
on the insights of Kuhn, and argues that mysterious imperatives con-
trol the direction of scholarly research, and that such imperatives are 
neither irrational or rational, neither logical nor illogical; they 
merely exist. Then why could current common sense not be re-
phrased as "current collective bias"? Why could not the "success" of 
a work of scholarship be equated with its "fashionability," using that 
term in its most whimsical sense? 
This troublesome logic suggests that communities of scholars 
may well be receptive to works whose methodology implicitly denies 
that collective bias and fashionability are the basic determinants of 
successful scholarship. Put another way, a work whose methodology 
minimizes the importance of its own individualized origins, a work 
that appeals to others through arguments other than nakedly biased 
ones, is also seeking to reassure a professional community of readers 
that current common sense ultimately means something more than 
fashionability. Interpretive detachment can perform part of this pro-
fessional function. 
I have earlier argued that the "success" of a work of historical 
scholarship is not determined solely by its plausibility, but also by its 
suggestiveness. I have argued further that currently "successful" 
scholarship in legal history communicates not only on interpretive 
levels that are analytically descriptive, but on levels that are analyti-
cally normative. Finally, I have argued that the suggestiveness of a 
historical explanation is ultimately linked to its capacity to engage 
the reader: to succeed in convincing the reader of its promise as a 
guideline for future study and as a normative message. How can one 
reconcile these observations with the idea of interpretive detach-
ment? 
At this point I want to return to the levels of communication that 
were set forth earlier. Recall that arguments at the level of historiog-
raphy make claims for the primacy of a particular interpretation of 
historical evidence, while arguments at the level of metahistory make 
claims for the primacy of a theoretical organization of reality. To 
the extent that historiographic interpretations are overwhelmed by a 
March 1981] Truth and Interpretation in History 607 
metahistorical perspective, the biases of the presentation have not 
been adequately neutralized. An apparent consequence of unneu-
tralized bias is that arguments at the level of metapolitics, which call 
for taking stock of the contemporary implications of the presenta-
tion, may be perceived as unprofessional or even as lacking in "cur-
rent common sense," and may therefore not sufficiently engage the 
reader. 
One could say at this point that the solution is to exorcise com-
munication at the levels of metahistory and meta politics from histor-
ical writing, and to return to a "truth in history" stance, where a 
scholar's interpretations are based on their fidelity to an "objective" 
historical record. But I have sought to show that such a stance mis-
conceives the historian's function and is almost impossible to imple-
ment. Historians cannot avoid interpretation, and "successful" 
interpretations become, through the process of provisional accept-
ance of their explanations by a professional community, surrogates 
for truth. 
Therefore it is too simple to believe that "truth in history" is a 
way out of the dilemma. It is also too simple to,believe that an histo-
rian can seriously advance historiographic arguments that lead to 
metahistorical arguments without identifying himself with his 
metahistorical perspective. Writers of fiction regularly respond to 
scholarly criticism of their work by categorical statements that they 
did not "intend" the meaning a critic "found" in their writing. But if 
their writing can fairly be said to have supported such a meaning, 
they can hardly cut off inquiry by a denial that it was intended. 
There is another option possible. Those who welcome the pres-
ence of metahistorical arguments in historical writing but also be-
lieve in the value of interpretive detachment can pay sharper 
attention to the precise relationship in their writing between theories 
of historical interpretation and theories of metahistory and 
metapolitics. That relationship can be seen, using the terms of this 
essay, as a process of engagement, detachment, and reengagement. 
The writer engages the reader with the suggestiveness of an interpre-
tation, but presents that interpretation in a manner that emphasizes 
its internal logic, its contemporary fit, and its current common sense. 
In so doing the writer is seeking, as a preliminary strategy, to detach 
his interpretation from any grand theory of reality that the interpre-
tation conveys. Then, after the reader has digested and assessed the 
plausibility of the interpretation, he is led, by the power of the inter-
pretation itself, to consider its suggestiveness - to assess the theoret-
ical perspective on which it implicitly rests and the guidelines it 
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provides for future research. In the schema of this Essay, metahis-
torical perspectives must not be permitted to overwhelm historio-
graphic interpretations; historiographic interpretations must be 
consistent with a number of plausible metahistorical perspectives 
and must provide suggestive examples for professionals. An inter-
pretation of this kind can be said to be consistent with, but not de-
pendent upon, a view of reality. A reader can reject that view of 
reality but still consider the interpretation plausible. But if the 
reader finds the interpretation plausible, and suggestive as well, he 
will be exposed anew to its theoretical implications, including its 
normative messages as a current political statement. Once an inter-
pretation conforms to the canon of interpretive detachment at the 
level of historiography, it qualifies as an interpretation that can yield 
suggestive and plausible theories of metahistory and metapolitics. 
I now want to consider whether Marxist legal historiography at-
tempts historical explanations that can be sajd to attempt to neutral-
ize bias and thereby take into account the canon of interpretive 
detachment. That inquiry, of course, places Marxist historical expla-
nations within the general analytic framework of this Essay, which 
offers a theory of historical explanation. A Marxist legal historian 
could assert that my theory is flawed and therefore my analysis of 
Marxism is not germane. But at that point the common ground of 
discussion would be lost. My analysis assumes an inquiry of com-
mon concern to historians, regardless of their ideological persuasion, 
that can be stated as follows: If the professional standing of a histor-
ical narrative cannot be based on its fidelity to truth, but must be 
based on the plausibility and ~uggestiveness of its organizing inter-
pretations, can a historian advance an interpretation of stature that 
violates the canon of interpretive detachment? 
Ill. MARXIST LEGAL HISTORY AND THE PROCESS OF HISTORICAL 
EXPLANATION 
Marxism takes a distinctive view of history that is normally la-
beled "materialist." The materialist view of history can be said to be 
composed of two elements, a theory of the principal locus of thought 
and a theory of change. Marxism asserts that thought emanates 
from "the mode of production of material life." In Karl Marx's 
words, the mode of production "conditions the social, political, and 
intellectual life process in general," so that "definite forms of social 
consciousness," including "a legal . . . superstructure," emanate 
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from "the economic structure of society."21 Ideas are thus 
"anchored in . . . the material setting of history";22 they do not exist 
independent of it. 
The concept of a mode of production, however, refers to "eco-
nomic activity" in an expansive sense of that term. "Modes of pro-
duction" are intended to include the means by which participants in 
the economic structure of society establish, and justify, their relations 
in society and their relations with one another. Here Marxism 
makes the assumption that within any mode of production there will 
be disharmonies among participants, and that these disharmonies 
will take the form of class antagonisms arising from "the unequal 
relations between the superior and inferior class within any mode."23 
The principal unequal relationship is that between the "ruling class" 
and the "under class," and the chief manifestation of inequality is 
"the vastly disproportionate access to, or ownership of wealth that is 
the prerogative of the ruling class."24 
Marxists believe that class antagonisms arising from inequalities 
within a mode of production are the chief source of historical 
change. The underclasses protest such inequalities and the ruling 
classes seek to justify them. The result is a complex of responses: 
"false" ideologies created by the ruling classes to deemphasize their 
power or to emphasize the common values that they share with the 
underclasses; shifts in the composition of ruling and underclasses as 
new means of production come into being; open attempts on the part 
of the ruling classes to oppress the underclasses. This complex of 
responses to class antagonisms produces change. History is the pro-
gressive record of such change. 
The use of the adjective "progressive" in Marxist theories of his-
tory is necessary because for Marxists the class struggle, and the con-
sequent changes that it produces, is only a stage of history that will 
ultimately lead to sharpened class antagonisms, a "dictatorship of 
the proletariat," and ultimately a classless society. This predictive 
feature of Marxism has caused its adherents acute practical 
problems, but my concern here is with Marxist approaches to his-
tory, not Marxist prognostications of the future. More specifically, 
my concern centers upon the materialist treatment of ideas and the 
motivation of those who articulate them. 
21. Marx, Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, reprinted in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER 3, 4 (R. Tucker ed. 1978). 
22. R. HEILBRONER, MARXISM FOR AND AGAINST 63 (1980). 
23. Id. at 68. 
24. Id. 
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Marx once said that "it is not the consciousness of men that de-
termines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that de-
termines their consciousness."25 His collaborator Friedrich Engels 
added that "the ultimate causes of all social changes . . . are to be 
sought, not in the minds of men . . . but in changes in the mode of 
production and exchange."26 Engels noted, on another occasion, 
that "constitutions established by the victorious class after a success-
ful battle," 'judicial forms," and 'Juristic [and] philosophical theo-
ries" were "various elements of the superstructure" whose "basis" 
was "the economic situation."27 The clear import of these comments 
for legal history is that the presence of ratified constitutions, or of 
established legal doctrines, or of commonly accepted theories of law, 
is explained by their connection to the existing class struggle within 
the existing mode of production. 
When this theory of the ultimate explanatory source of legal his-
tory is combined with the notion of "false" ideology in the ruling 
class, the legal historian who approaches history from a Marxist per-
spective seems to adhere to a theory of the causes of legal change 
whose metahistorical and metapolitical components overwhelm its 
historiographic component. If the ruling classes invariably seek to 
further their interests at the expense of the underclasses, but may do 
so in a variety of "apparent" or "false" ways, any justification that 
legal institutions advance for their decisions becomes fodder for a 
Marxist interpretation. If a judge, for example, states that the pur-
pose of a decision barring workers from suing their employers for 
injuries caused by the negligence of co-workers is to promote the 
interests of owners of the means of production rather than the inter-
ests of workers, his decision can be taken as overt evidence of a rul-
ing class perspective held by courts. If, however, the judge states 
that the basis of his decision is to encourage workers in an occupa-
tion to be more mindful of their safety, his reasoning can be inter-
preted as a "false" ideology designed to disguise the true purpose of 
putting the costs of such injuries on workers. 28 
25. Marx, supra note 21, at 4. 
26. Engels, Herr Eugen .Dlihring's Revolution in Science (Anti-.Dlihring), reprinted in A 
HANDBOOK OF MARXISM 279 (E. Bums ed. 1935). 
27. Letter from Friedrich Engels to Joseph Bloch (Sept. 21-22, 1890), reprinted in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 21, at 760. 
28. Morton Horwitz, in The Transformation of American Law, seems aware of this diffi-
culty and attempts to avoid it. He demonstrates that courts made use of a "contractarian" 
doctrinal framework to "transform" a conception of fellow-servant cases as raising issues of 
"substantive justice" into a conception of those cases as raising issues of the economic market-
place. M. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 209. One reading of Horwitz's interpretation, then, is 
that the courts merely adopted a different set of "intellectual premises" on which their doctri-
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If a judge decides to change an existing rule of law for "the pub-
lic good" or because "public policy demands" it, a Marxist can treat 
such rhetoric as "false" and can initiate a search for the "true" im-
pact of the change on the various classes within the mode of produc-
tion. Alternatively, if a judge decides to follow an existing rule on 
the grounds of its longstanding acceptance or because settled expec-
tations would be upset if it were changed, a Marxist can equate "set-
tled expectations" with the expectations of the ruling class, and 
"acceptance" of the rule with furthering the interests of the ruling 
class or disadvantaging the interests of the underclasses.29 As the 
logic of this methodology is played out, any evidence of change in 
legal history - the establishment or modification of a constitution, 
the rise and fall of legal doctrines, the shifting theories used to justify 
one ·outcome or another - can be seen as emanating from tensions 
within the mode of production. 
In the works of leading Marxist legal historians, law serves as an 
instrument fot establishing or ratifying the hegemony of the ruling 
class. But is it not even necessary to a materialist interpretation of 
legal history that law be so designated. An occasional judicial deci-
sion, piece of legislation, or constitutional provision may be directed 
at curbing the power of the ruling class, reducing the inequalities 
between actors in the means of production, or even sharpening 
awareness of the class struggle. Indeed, given Marxism's progressive 
view of history, one might expect such instances to occur. Scholarly 
interpretations of a given legal rule as promoting the interests of one 
or another set of actors within the class struggle, however, need not 
depend on the justifications articulated on behalf of the rule. Those 
justifications may be taken as "true" or discarded as "false" because 
nal framework rested. Id. at 210. For Horwitz, however, "intellectual premises" have a cen-
tral purpose: he argues that through "contract ideology" the "law had come simply to ratify 
those forms of inequality that the market system produced." How, then, would Horwitz inter-
pret fellow-servant cases that, during the period of "contractarian" analysis was dominant, 
grounded their decisions in the "substantive justice" of safety for workers? It seems that either 
those decisions do not support Horwitz's interpretation or the decisions are engaging in "false" 
rhetoric. 
29. One might note here that Horwitz parallels his demonstration of the emerging formal-
ism of American private law in the nineteenth century with a characterization of formalism as 
representing "the successful culmination of efforts by mercantile and entrepreneurial interests 
during the preceding half century to transform the law to serve their interests, leaving them to 
wish for the first time to :freeze' legal doctrine . ... " Id. at 259 (emphasis added). In the 
conclusion of The Trans.formation of American Law, Horwitz argues explicitly at the levels of 
metahistory and metapolitics: "[T]he paramount social condition that is necessary for legal 
formalism to flourish in a society is for the powerful groups in that society to have a great 
interest in disguising and suppressing the inevitably political and redistributive functions of 
law." Id. at 266. 
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of assumptions made about the way antagonistic actors within the 
mode of production behave. 
The writing of legal history from a Marxist theoretical perspec-
tive therefore appears to face two related problems: the problem of 
not being able to neutralize its biases, and the problem of not con-
vincing other scholars that its contributions can serve as fruitful ex-
amples for· further work. Such scholarship seems to violate the 
canon of interpretive detachment, and because it has violated that 
canon, to fail to satisfy the criterion of engagement as well. Perhaps 
a saving distinction can be made. A Marxist legal historian could 
argue for the primacy of the model that he advances but concede 
that there will be instances when the model breaks down. The 
model is extremely useful, one could say, in providing a hypothetical 
set of motivations for participants in the class struggle who make use 
of law. One can presume that actors will want to use law to ratify or 
to change their position in the class struggle, or perhaps to make 
others aware of the internally contradictory nature of ostensibly co-
operative social efforts, such as the production of goods and services 
for the marketplace. But that presumption is not conclusive: some-
times the language reveals that actors do not see themselves as moti-
vated by their position in the class struggle or do not even seem 
aware that it is taking place. At that point the purpose of a Marxist 
approach to legal history is to supply "secret" or "unconscious" 
motivations for actors who cannot avoid participation in the class 
struggle even though they fail to recognize it. 
If this distinction is to be truly saving, it would seem that Marxist 
interpretations of legal history should acknowledge the potential 
plausibility of interpretations that deny the primary assumptions of 
Marxist theory. Marxist interpretations would then pose a different 
·question: Given several historiographical interpretations that satisfy 
the criteria of internal logic and contemporary fit, does a Marxist 
interpretation better accord with current common sense? 
To pose such a question is to treat interpretations of legal actors' 
motivations that rely on factors other than the actors' place in the 
economic structure of society as competitive with the interpretations 
of Marxism. If several interpretations achieved reader engagement, 
current common sense could then determine whether, in the main, a 
Marxist approach to the motivation of legal actors or some equally 
suggestive alternative approach would be deemed more plausible, 
and hence "successful," or whether a Marxist approach could be re-
garded as more plausible in some situations but not in others. 
I suspect that some Marxist historians might be inclined to accept 
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this compromise. But when the issue is one of causation in history, 
the very universality of Marxist theory makes such a compromise 
precarious. Take the role of ideas as a causative agent in history as 
an example. If, according to Marxist metahistory, ideas have no in-
dependent meaning apart from their material context, how can one 
take seriously "competitive" historical interpretations that suggest 
that ideas can be unrelated to their material contexts or can even 
shape the contexts themselves? Seemingly, these interpretations 
must be treated as misguided because they do not account for the 
difference between "false" and "true" justifications; their arguments 
are accordingly based on the "wrong" historical evidence. No com-
promise seems possible here: the theory of ideas as causative agents 
violates the initial assumptions of Marxist theory. 
In sum, when one subjects an internally coherent and self-rein-
forcing system of belief, such as Marxism, to the tests of effective 
historical interpretation advanced in this essay, the very qualities 
that give that system its internal consistency cause it to yield histori-
cal interpretations that may "fail" in two respects. The comprehen-
siveness of Marxism as a system of metapolitics is based on the 
fidelity of its practitioners to assumptions whose primacy is not chal-
lenged; since that primacy is never questioned, the interpretations 
supplied by Marxist historians seemingly provide suggestive guide-
lines for future research only to those who adopt Marxist metapoli-
tics. Uncompromised Marxist interpretations thus fail to achieve 
interpretive detachment and to engage non-Marxist professionals.30 
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME ISSUES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
In attempting to find a middle ground between theories of histor-
ical interpretation that rest on the idea of "truth in history" and the-
ories, such as Marxism, that rest on metahistorical and metapolitical 
assumptions, I have, as is doubtless apparent by now, exhibited a 
logical vulnerability to both of the approaches I have been criticiz-
ing. How can I argue for "detachment" in historical interpretation, 
an apostle of "truth in history" might ask, and yet deny the intelligi-
30. The difference between "uncompromised" and "compromised" Marxist historiography 
is largely a question of how universal one takes the metahistory of Marxism to be. If the 
metahistory is taken to be so universal that counter examples must be incorporated within it, 
as in the fellow-servant example, then, in the terms of this Essay, metapolitics and metahistory 
have overwhelmed historiography and interpretive detachment has been lost. If counter exam-
ples are taken, however, as fodder for the competitive interpretations that Marxism seeks to 
dispute, then to some extent a Marxist interpretation seems to recognize that its success de-
pends not exclusively on its "correctness," but also on the "current common sense" of histori-
ans. 
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bility of an objective historical record? Where does "detachment" 
come from if not from phenomena external to the interpreter? And 
how can I concede that ultimately "current common sense" deter-
mines the success of historical interpretations, a Marxist might ask, 
and yet claim that a Marxist interpretation would off end current 
common sense? What if the great bulk of historians were Marxists? 
These hypothetical queries lead me to stress again the complex 
relationship between interpretive detachment and the unintelligibil-
ity of "truth in history." Once one denies that historical interpreta-
tions can be tested by recourse to some objective record, the dragon 
is out of its cave. One can no longer, as an interpreter of the past, 
claim that one is merely recording the past: it is the act of interpreta-
tion that counts, and, as Popper says, interpretations are never final. 
What does a member of a professional community whose per-
ceived function is to make the past intelligible and meaningful to 
persons living in the present do with this insight? One response, of 
course, is that of the Marxists: since interpretation is history, and 
since interpretations are necessarily personal and to some extent ide-
ological, Marxists refine their ideological beliefs, make them explicit, 
and argue for their interpretations. There is a kind of courage in this 
position, in addition to its apparent logic. Such a response, however, 
strikes me as quixotic because it misconceives the nature of profes-
sional communities in contemporary society. Professional communi-
ties, I believe, are united not by ideology, but by tacitly accepted 
definitions of their professional functions. However one defines the 
function of an historian, it is not synonymous with the function of an 
ideologue. Even if one rejects the criteria for "successful" historical 
scholarship that I have set forth in this Essay, I suspect that one 
would have to substitute criteria that sharply distinguish between the 
art of historical interpretation and the art of ideological oratory. The 
principal reason this substitution would be necessary is the collapse 
of the idea of truth in history. That idea, or some version of it, has 
been sufficiently powerful and sufficiently long-lived to associate the 
role of being a historian with the act of suspending intuitive contem-
porary judgment when examining the past. The reflex of judgment . 
suspension - the avoidance of anachronistic reasoning - is suffi- · 
ciently ingrained in historians, I believe, to constitute what Kuhn 
would call a shared professional imperative. 
What is the future of this professional imperative, however, if we 
reject the idea of truth in history and the corresponding idea that the 
historian can be "objective?" What if a version of Kuhnian logic 
that ends up with the proposition that one cannot say how or why 
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professional imperatives come and go, that the process is essentially 
mysterious, is correct? My sense is that Kuhn's logic may be terri-
fying for historians who have abandoned the idea ·of truth in history. 
The "objective" criteria for testing the worth of historical interpreta-
tions have_been discarded, but no one can say where the remaining 
"subjective" criteria come from, how long they will last, or even, 
when pressed, what they are. How does one then know "good" his-
tory from "bad" history; where does one find the basis of one's pro-
fessional judgments? 
It is the sense of crisis that this logic engenders that, I suggest, has 
stimulated the production of historical scholarship that communi-
cates on the four levels I have previously identified. I do not see this 
"crisis" negatively; such crises are common in, and generally benefi-
cial to, the creative life of a profession, and this crisis has already 
contributed to the appearance of a number of significant works in 
American legal history. I also doubt that this crisis will resolve itself 
through a dramatic change in the roles and functions of members of 
a profession; I doubt that historians will abandon their strictures 
against anachronistic reasoning and become ideologues. 
Having said all this, I confess that I would like to see whether, on 
closer inquiry, the criterion of "current common sense," and indeed 
all of the criteria I have identified with plausible, suggestive, and 
"successful" historical scholarship, are as mysterious as they seem to 
be. Their very mysteriousness introduces a fascinating ambiguity to 
the concept of professionalization. If one is defining oneself as a 
professional and training others to act as such, but one can only say 
that the criteria for success in the profession are mysterious in nature 
and in origin, what is the difference between a profession and a se-
cret society? I have been down this path before in considering what, 
if anything, it means to "think like a lawyer"; it is a little disconcert-
ing to find the same snarls in the phrase ''writing like a historian." 
Thus this Essay is a prolegomenon in the sense that the criteria 
that I advance to support my approach are neither precisely stated 
nor rigorously applied. I have sought only to sketch out the general 
framework of my position, to identify its philosophical assumptions, 
and to contrast it with other general views. I have not filled in many 
of the details. Maybe all one can say about successful historical 
scholarship is that one "knows it when one sees it." But that despair-
ing suggestion ought not to excuse historians from attempting a 
fuller understanding of the relationship between truth and interpre-
tation in history. The dragon may be out of its cave, but it may not 
be a dragon after all. 
